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Abstract. We present a study of price impact in the over-the-counter credit
index market, where no limit order book is used. Contracts are traded via dealers,
that compete for the orders of clients. Despite this distinct microstructure,
we successfully apply the propagator technique to estimate the price impact
of individual transactions. Because orders are typically split less than in
multilateral markets, impact is observed to be mainly permanent, in line with
theoretical expectations. A simple method is presented to correct for errors in
our classification of trades between buying and selling. We find a very significant,
temporary increase in order flow correlations during late 2015 and early 2016,
which we attribute to increased order splitting or herding among investors. We
also find indications that orders advertised to less dealers may have lower price
impact. Quantitative results are compatible with earlier findings in other more
classical markets, further supporting the argument that price impact is a universal
phenomenon, to a large degree independent of market microstructure.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Price impact
Liquidity in financial markets is an elusive concept, with many definitions in existence.
From a practical point of view, however, one of its most important metrics is the
response of price to buying and selling. This reaction is called price impact, and it
has been treated in a long series of empirical papers (see e.g. Almgren et al. [2005],
Bouchaud et al. [2004, 2009], Hasbrouck [1991], Moro et al. [2009], To´th et al. [2011]
and refs. therein). One of the most important findings is that impact is not only
mechanical but dynamic, meaning that it cannot be described exclusively by the
revealed supply or demand at any given time – say the content of the visible limit
order book [Weber and Rosenow, 2005]. It is rather related to underlying “latent”
supply and demand [Donier et al., 2015, To´th et al., 2011] which correspond to the
intentions of market participants, and which manifest themselves over time. Most
of the recent studies of impact have been carried out on transparent, listed markets.
Nevertheless, many aspects of price impact appear to be universal, i.e. common to
many asset classes, even to exotic ones [Donier and Bonart, 2015, To´th et al., 2016].
In this paper, we will continue the exploration by presenting the price impact
of individual transactions in credit indices, where trading does not take place in
limit order books. The remainder of this section introduces these products, briefly
surveys the relevant literature, and presents the data used for our study. Section 2
then describes a naive approach to calculate impact based on a standard propagator
technique. Section 3 looks at the effect of misclassification between buy and sell trades,
and corrects the resulting biases in our results. Section 4 discusses a temporary pattern
of increased order splitting and higher impact observed in the data. Section 5 finds
indications that the impact of trades increases with the number of dealers involved.
Finally Section 6 concludes.
1.2. The credit index market
Today the credit index market is fairly mature. The most liquid derivative products are
proposed by Markit, we will look at four of them: two US based indices CDX IG (for
Investment Grade) and CDX HY (for High Yield), and their European counterparts
iTraxx Europe and iTraxx Crossover, respectively. These correspond to baskets of
CDSs [Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2014], each of which represents an insurance on bonds
of a given corporate issuer within the respective grade and geographical zone. The
instruments are standardized, their mechanics very much resembles futures contracts,
and they roll once every 6 months. At the time of the roll a new maturity is issued,
these are called “series”, for example S23, S24 and S25 for iTraxx Europe. On any
given day most of the liquidity is concentrated in the most recently issued five-year
series of each index at the time, in the following we will only study these (see table
1).
One particularity of this market – as opposed to stocks or futures – is that
it is purely over-the-counter (OTC), currently without any liquid limit order book.
Information is fragmented, there is no single, central source to verify when one is
looking for tradable prices, client orders pass through a large number of dealers
instead. The latter usually do provide indicative bid/ask prices, but the actual trades
are mostly done via Request for Quotes (RFQ), see also Hendershott and Madhavan
[2015]. This means that the client (liquidity taker) auctions off its trades to the
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liquidity providers, by sending them information about the conditions of the deal
(which product, buy or sell, size) either electronically or by voice, receiving competing
quotes in return, and taking the best price.
To counteract the bilateral design of OTC markets which favors opacity, the
Dodd-Frank Act has mandated several changes. Among them are obligatory post-
trade reporting, and the creation of Swap Exchange Facilities (SEFs) which provide
an organized framework to dealing in eligible OTC instruments. Today a large portion
of trades is required to go through SEFs, whose volume is predominantly done via
electronic RFQ. Even though they provide order books, those are – for the moment –
empty.
1.3. Literature review
Credit trading has received considerably less attention than equities or futures, and
most studies have been done by or in collaboration with regulators who have privileged
access to non-anonymous data. Gehde-Trapp et al. [2015] study records from the
German Bundesbank regarding single-name CDS issues. They find significant price
impact using a model where the effect of each trade is permanent. Shachar [2012] of
the New York Federal Reserve defines buy/sell orders by assuming that the initiator
of the trades is the end-user (as opposed to the dealer), and focuses to a large extent
on the inventory management of dealers. The study finds evidence of ”hot-potato”
trading [Lyons, 1997] whereby an initial client trade changes hands among dealers
several times, while its effect is being gradually incorporated into the price. Loon and
Zhong [2016] of the Securities and Exchange Commission focus on the same credit
indices as our study. Their work takes a policy-maker’s point of view, and argues that
the wider transparency created by the Dodd-Frank Act has improved several metrics
of liquidity. They focus particularly on the transitory period during the introduction
of the reform, whereas we will consider more recent data where market structure is
already relatively stable. Finally, Hendershott and Madhavan [2015] analyze both
electronic and voice trading in single-name CDS. Most notably they identify price
impact related to information leakage, especially when the client requests prices from
many dealers, and even if he finally decides not to trade.
1.4. The dataset
Our period of study is 17 June 2015 – 31 August 2016. For the four products we have
recorded a semi-realtime (several updates per minute) indicative data feed via a service
called CBBT (Composite Bloomberg Bond Trader). This represents a continuous,
electronic poll of recent executable prices from dealers. Nevertheless, it is not a bid or
ask price, only an indicative level around which one expects to be able to transact. At
some time t the indicative price is quoted as a credit spread st, which is the annualized
insurance premium in basis points.‡ In the following we will express all prices as basis
points of the typical credit spread itself, meaning
mt = 10
4 × st〈st〉 ,
where 〈·〉 denotes a time average.
‡ Note that the quoting convention for CDX HY is different from the rest, but the credit spread can
be recalculated based on the available prices.
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Table 1. Summary of the different credit index products studied. Notice that
the value of G is much more stable than that of R across different series of the
same product.
Product code Avg. intertrade Neff R(` = 30) G(` = 30)
time [sec] [bps] [bps]
CDX HY S24 75 2.3 5.8 3.4
CDX HY S25 66 14.2 51.2 3.9
CDX HY S26 90 1.7 7.1 4.2
CDX IG S24 113 1.6 11.8 7.5
CDX IG S25 92 9.8 55.0 4.9
CDX IG S26 119 2.8 10.0 5.3
iTraxx Crossover S23 128 1.5 13.4 9.3
iTraxx Crossover S24 106 5.7 65.4 6.6
iTraxx Crossover S25 199 1.2 19.9 10.6
iTraxx Europe S23 171 1.4 15.8 10.1
iTraxx Europe S24 132 7.1 67.1 8.4
iTraxx Europe S25 181 2.0 21.4 10.2
Anonymous information about trades is also available from a different source:
trade repositories mandated by regulation. We have used the records of two such
organizations.§ These include a substantial part of all trades with credit spread,
timestamp, volume and other additional information.
While the data are rich and relatively clean, the two sources (prices and trades)
are independent, and there is no a priori reason for perfect synchronization between
the two.
2. Naive propagators
Price impact is often analyzed in the context of linear models, where the market price
mt just before trade t is written as a linear combination of the time dependent impact
of past trades [Bouchaud et al., 2004]:
mt =
∑
t′<t
[G(t− t′)t′ + ηt′ ] +m−∞. (1)
t′ is the sign of the trade at time t
′ (+ for buyer, − for seller initiated trades), and
ηt′ is an independent noise term. G(`) is called the ‘propagator’, and it describes
how the price at time t is modified due to the trade at t − `. In equity and futures
markets, this propagator is found to decay with time, i.e. a large part of price impact
is transient rather than permanent (for a recent study of the long term behaviour of
G(`) in equities, see Brokmann et al. [2015]).
In order to calibrate the model (1) one calculates the response function R(`),
which is defined as
R(`) = 〈(mt+` −mt) · t〉, (2)
and which quantifies the price move after a trade, but not necessarily due to the trade.
One then measures the autocorrelation of order signs, which is is customarily defined
as
C(`) = 〈tt+`〉. (3)
§ Data from Bloomberg SDRV is available at http://www.bloombergsdr.com/, and from the DTCC
at http://www.dtcc.com/repository-otc-data.
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Figure 1. An example of the time evolution of indicative credit spread and its
value reported for trades. We show the product iTraxx Europe S25 on 31 August
2016.
And finally one solves the linear equation [Bouchaud et al., 2006]
R(`) =
∑
0<n≤`
G(n)C(`− n) +
∑
n>0
[G(n+ `)−G(n)]C(n) (4)
to map out the numerical value of G(`).‖
To guess the sign of trades one often relies on some heuristic. If we denote the
price of trade t by pt, then simply
t = sign(pt −mt). (5)
An example of transaction and reference prices is shown in figure 1.
As one can see from figure 2, the shape of C(`) is well fitted by a stretched
exponential. This is true for most individual products and on average across them,
and it is in contrast with earlier studies in order book markets, where C(`) rather
decays as a slow, power-law function [Bouchaud et al., 2009]. In the latter liquidity
at good prices is often small [Bouchaud et al., 2006], so large orders tend to be sliced,
producing a long-range autocorrelation of small trades. In OTC markets clients are
encouraged to request deals that correspond to their full liquidity needs, so that after
the trade is done, the dealer offloading the inventory just acquired will not have to
compete for liquidity with the same client. Since trades are bilateral, the dealer knows
the identity of the client, and can reward or penalize it by adjusting the bid-ask spread
according to any adverse selection perceived on earlier deals [Osler et al., 2016].
‖ In fact, it is much better to solve numerically the corresponding equation for the discrete derivative
of G in terms of the discrete derivative of R. This is what we have done in this paper.
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Since the order sign process is not long range correlated, its autocorrelation
function is integrable and one can therefore define an effective number of correlated
orders via
Neff =
∞∑
`=0
C(`).
This value varies between 1.2 and 14.2, as reported in table 1. These differences
are due to time periods, we will study this point further in Section 4
We can calculate the propagator via (4), their average across products is given
in figure 3. Bouchaud et al. [2004] have shown that if C(`) has a power-law form,
then the propagator should itself decay over time as a power-law in order to maintain
the efficiency of prices. In other words, impact is mostly transient in that case. On
the other hand, since our C(`) is short ranged, the same argument predicts that G(`)
should tend to a constant for large `, corresponding to a non-zero permanent impact
component. This is indeed what we observe, see figure 3.
Calculating G from R involves inverting a matrix whose elements are related to
C. This operation amplifies the noise in the correlations, and so it is useful to also
give approximate formulas that avoid this. If we know that G is increasing before
converging to a fixed value, and C is positive, then from (4) one can find two bounds
on G(`). In the limit when C(`) reaches zero much more quickly than G(`) goes to its
asymptotic value, we can write for large ` that
(2Neff − 1)−1R(`) ≤ G(`). (6)
Conversely, if we assume that G saturates immediately, then R will be maximal, and
for large ` we get
G(`) ≤ N−1eff R(`). (7)
Figure 3 shows these bounds which are not excessively wide, as well as the real G
calculated numerically.
In reality the propagator – which was not observed in previous studies – increases
steeply but continuously in the initial period. This makes sense in the absence of a
central orderbook: The information that someone bought or sold takes a finite time
of 5− 10 trades to diffuse in the market and to get incorporated into the price.
Beyond the propagators which give a microscopic description of price moves, one
can also look at a more aggregate characterization by dividing the data into 15 minute
bins. Then one can calculate in each bin b the net signed notional defined as
Ib =
∑
t∈b
tQt,
where the sum runs over trades in the bin, and Qt is the notional value of trade t. As
a function of this quantity one can calculate the average price change rb = mb−mb−1
over the bin. Figure 4 confirms a strong correlation, similar results can be obtained
regardless of the precise time scale. Note the concavity of this plot, also observed in
many other markets with order books (see e.g. [Bouchaud et al., 2009], figure 2.5).
Although we do not have enough statistics to test on our trades the
√
Q impact law
universally observed in all markets studied so far, we believe that the concave shape
seen in figure 4 is compatible with the general “latent liquidity” idea of Donier et al.
[2015], To´th et al. [2011].
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Figure 2. (left) Average of the sign autocorrelation C(`), and the stretched
exponential fit a × exp(−b`)ν , with a = 0.43, b = 0.16 and ν = 2/3.
(right) Average of the response function R(`), and the stretched exponential fit
a× [1− exp(−b`)ν ], with a = 33.9, b = 0.068 and ν = 0.88.
Figure 3. Average value across products of various quantities: (red points)
Propagator G(`), (red line) fits of the former quantity with the same stretched
exponential form as above. (red shaded area) Bounds on G(`) based on (6) and (7).
Note that as expected these are only valid for large `. (blue line) The true, bias-
adjusted propagator Gtrue(`) calculated with the fits of Ctrue(`) and Rtrue(`),
and divided by a factor 3 for better readability.
3. Correction for the noise in order signs
In the previous section we have confirmed the existence of price impact in OTC credit
indices. However, the magnitude of the effect remains to be validated for the following
reason. It is known that the heuristic (5) for identifying order signs does not always
give correct results. If t is incorrect, naturally all expectation values calculated from
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Figure 4. The average return in 15-minute windows normalized by their absolute
mean (rb/ 〈|rb|〉), as a function of the imbalance normalized by its own standard
deviation (Ib/std(Ib)). Data points have been separated into 30 groups according
to their rank on the horizontal axis, we show the average returns in each group.
Outliers outside the horizontal range [−3,+3] have been discarded. The purple
lines correspond to individual products, and the red points to all products
together. The dashed line is a linear fit with slope 1/3. Note the clear concavity
of the average curve as the volume imbalance increases.
it will be incorrect as well. In order to verify such biases in our results, we are going
to use a proprietary dataset including 252 trades executed over the same period by
our firm (CFM).
As opposed to the detected trade sign t, let us introduce the notation 
true
t for
the true sign of the same order, which is not a priori known, except for those of CFM.
It is also convenient to introduce an auxiliary variable qt that is 1 when we classified
the trade correctly, and 0 when we did not. This way
t = qt
true
t + (1− qt)× (−truet ) ≡ truet (2qt − 1). (8)
If we look at the above mentioned CFM trades, the rate of correct classification,
described by the average 〈qt〉t∈CFM, is only 72%. This value is constant within noise
level across different months in the sample.
As a first step we would like to show that basic correlations of the detected order
signs t are the same in the CFM subset of trades and the rest. Let us compare
C(`) = 〈tt+`〉 with the subsample average
CCFM(`) = [〈tt+`〉t∈CFM + 〈tt+`〉t+`∈CFM]/2,
where we conditioned on at least one of the trades belonging to CFM. Figure 5 shows
that there is a fair match, especially for short lags. This gives an indication that
other statistics calculated on CFM trades may be approximately similar to the whole
market, and can be used in the following.
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Let us now look at how misclassification biases our earlier calculations. Let us
define
Ctrue(`) =
〈
truet 
true
t+`
〉
=
〈
truet t+`
〉
+
〈
truet (
true
t+` − t+`)
〉
. (9)
We can readily measure the first term when t ∈ CFM, whereas for ` ≥ 1 the second
term can be rewritten as〈
truet (
true
t+` − t+`)
〉
= − 〈truet truet+` · 2(qt+` − 1)〉 ≈〈
truet 
true
t+`
〉 · 2(〈qt+`〉 − 1) = −2Ctrue(`) · (〈qt〉 − 1). (10)
For the approximation step we assumed that whether or not we make a mistake
in identification is independent of the two-point product of true signs. After
reorganization and assuming that we can use CFM trades in part of the correlation,
we get
Ctrue(` ≥ 1) =
〈truet t+`〉t∈CFM
2 〈qt〉 − 1 . (11)
This estimation of Ctrue(`) is shown in figure 5.
As for the response function, one can define its “true” variant as
Rtrue(`) = 〈(mt+` −mt) · truet 〉. (12)
This is related to the response with detected order signs as
R(`) = 〈(pt+` − pt)t〉 =
〈(pt+` − pt)× (2qt − 1)truet 〉 ≈ (2〈qt〉 − 1)Rtrue(`). (13)
In the approximation step we neglect the correlation of identification error and future
price change. Finally:
Rtrue(`) = R(`)
2〈qt〉 − 1 . (14)
Finally one can define a true propagator Gtrue(`) via (4) by inserting Rtrue(`) and
Ctrue(`). If we use (11) and (14) for the approximation of these latter, one can obtain
the numerical value of the true propagator averaged over all products, see figure 3.
This shows that finally Gtrue(`) ≈ 3G(`).
4. Seasonal patterns in order splitting
We now revisit our results to study their variation across time. Figure 6 shows the
measured value of Neff in monthly windows. One can see that order correlations
intensify at the turn of the year, while at the same time credit spreads climb to a
local maximum. Liquidity itself remains roughly constant. In figure 7 we offer a more
detailed view of the effect, by showing the cumulative autocorrelation
∑`
`′=0 C(`
′) for
each month separately (averages over all products). We do not see much structure in
periods of low correlation, while during high correlation C is very positive up to 10–20
trades. Note that the mis-classifier variable qt is reasonably stationary, so that this
seasonality is too strong to result from an incorrect classification of trades.
An explanation could be given in the context of the ”hot-potato” theory of Lyons
[1997], advocated for credit markets in Shachar [2012]. Clients are expected to trade
the full required size in a single deal, so further orders (and hence Neff > 1) could come
from the subsequent inter-dealer exchange of risk. In the period of difficult markets
liquidity becomes ”recycled” as it takes a longer time for the position to find a final
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Figure 5. Cumulative sign autocorrelation functions. The estimated curve
corresponds to (11).
Figure 6. The points in color show the effective number of correlated trades for
each product, measured in 1-month periods. The dashed black line represents the
credit spread shifted and normalized such that the data spans the interval [0, 1],
this is an average over the four products.
counter party to warehouse the risk. This, however, does not explain the increase of
R which is shown in figure 8. Response is amplified in proportion to correlations,
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Figure 7. The cumulative trade sign autocorrelation
∑`
`′=0 C(`
′), averaged
across products. Each curve corresponds to a 1-month period.
which means that these additional trades have full impact, and they likely cause a net
variation of dealer inventory [Shachar, 2012]. Hence this is more likely the signature
of increased real order splitting or herding among clients, in the spirit of recent papers
on transparent markets [Bouchaud et al., 2009].
5. Comparison of on-SEF and off-SEF trades
Loon and Zhong [2016] compare various forms of trading, and argue that in the
transitory period after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, increased market transparency
has lead to lower trading cost and price impact. Their data dates from 2013, when
uncleared and off-SEF trading were still commonplace. In our more recent dataset
only 11% of all trades are off-SEF, and in terms of transparency we no longer expect
much difference. More importantly though, on-SEF it is mandatory to have at least
three competing brokers when requesting a price, whereas on electronic platforms for
off-SEF this is at most three brokers. It is common lore among traders that increased
competition might reduce instantaneous costs, but as Hendershott and Madhavan
[2015] also show, it leads to higher information leakage, and thus more impact.
It is straightforward to extend (1) to a case where trades are classified into discrete
categories pi Eisler et al. [2011], each of which has its own propagator Gpi. If each trade
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Figure 8. The points in show the response function R after 30 trades for the
each product, measured in 1-month periods.
t′ falls into category pit′ , then
mt =
∑
t′<t
[
Gpit′ (t− t′)t′ + ηt′
]
+m−∞. (15)
We use this technique to separate on-SEF and off-SEF execution, the naive impact
kernels and the corresponding theoretical bounds are shown in figure 9. Indeed, despite
the high noise level we find that off-SEF trades have significantly lower impact than
on-SEF ones. This is not a result of the orders themselves being smaller, the mean size
and the shape of the distribution are nearly identical, see figure 10. We see this rather
as support for the theory of Hendershott and Madhavan [2015], that price impact
grows with the number of dealers involved.
6. Conclusion
At first the microstructure of the OTC credit index market seems different from that
of equity and futures markets, as it is centered around dealers, without a central
order book. However, we find that from the point of view of order flow and price
impact, the differences are only quantitative. Client orders are much less split, and
as a consequence, the impact of an isolated order, as expressed by G, reaches a
permanent plateau. The numerical value of impact, after correcting for the imperfect
identification of order signs, is the same order of magnitude as the bid-ask spreads in
our daily trading experience. This is in line with what is expected based on theoretical
arguments about the break-even costs of market making Wyart et al. [2008]. The
propagator takes 5 − 10 trades, in real time more than 15 minutes, to reach its final
level. Because the market is very fragmented, it takes this long for the effect of a trade
to become fully incorporated in the price.
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Figure 9. Naive propagators for on-SEF and off-SEF trades. The shaded
areas correspond to the theoretical bounds derived from the multi-propagator
equivalents of (6) and (7), which are only expected to be valid for large `.
Figure 10. The distribution of order sizes on-SEF and off-SEF, close to an
exponential. Both are normalized by their (nearly identical) respective means,
which are shown in the legend.
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Qualitatively the behavior is in line with what was observed for other, more
frequently studied products. This finding gives further support to the argument that
price impact is a universal phenomenon, and it behaves similarly in classical markets
and more “exotic” ones such as Bitcoin Donier and Bonart [2015], options To´th et al.
[2016] and now credit.
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